

Catalonia in the process of constructing the modern Spanish state (16th-18th centuries): An interpretative approach

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ABSTRACT

This article offers an interpretative overview of Catalonia's difficult and ultimately forcible fit into the Spanish state that emerged in modern times. More specifically, it is concerned with the approximately 150-year period ranging from the mid-16th century to the end of the War of the Spanish Succession in the early 18th century. This article's interpretation of the Spanish state's process of political *union* is an interpretative counterpoint to the deterministic vision that is so prevalent in Spanish nationalistic historiography.

KEYWORDS: Catalonia, Spanish monarchy, state, nation, process of political union

INTRODUCTION

The process of construction of the modern Spanish state and the articulation of Catalonia's historical formation have been and continue to be essential issues in the Catalan and Spanish historiographic debate.

In this article, we shall limit ourselves to summarily examining one phase in this long development, namely the period that signalled the transition from an aggregative, institutionally plural monarchy to another territorial form which, in the wake of the Bourbon victory in the War of the Spanish Succession, consolidated a central space – Spain – that was much more unified and characterised by absolutist and centralising forms of government with Castilian roots.¹

It should immediately be noted that this kind of process of political “union” based on a “composite monarchy”, “segmented state” or “dynastic agglomeration” was not exclusive to Spain; rather it was fairly common in Europe in modern times.² However, we should also add that these processes had quite different means and results in terms of both the constitutive model of state and its territorial organisation. These means were even more varied and nuanced if we bear in mind the evolution in such important social, cultural and identity features as religion, private law and language.³

With regard to the process of “union” in Spain in particular, it should be noted that a nationalistic geopolitical deterministic historiographic discourse has prevailed for many years. According to this vision, the construction of

a state entity linked to the Spanish “nation” was the only possible option for the trajectory of the different historical formations on Spain; this viewpoint also argues that the modernising pathway necessarily entailed the construction of a centralised, unified state. In the logic of this interpretation, the institutional pluralism of the Hapsburg monarchy would be a mediaevalising form of state, the reason behind the Spanish crisis in the 17th century during which Portugal was “lost”. This theoretical construct, which obviously has a strong political and ideological bias, was first elaborated by the intelligentsia of the Castilian court in the 16th and 17th centuries and more recently upheld by historians with a wide range of ideologies. Indeed, Falangists, monarchists, historians linked to a Marxist or Marxistising history, a good number of Basque and Catalan historians and some Hispanists have also partaken of this interpretation.⁴

Given that the unifying model of the Castilian court coexisted with the model of the Crown of Aragon in the early centuries of modernity, one of the fundamental purposes of this Spanish deterministic discourse was to discredit or distort the “confederal” and “constitutional” model of state of the Crown of Aragon and Catalonia, something which has been attempted from each of the territories linked to this model.

Specifically, the aims in the Spanish nationalist discourse to discredit Catalonia's model stand upon three basic strands of argumentation. The first is the contrast between the modernising, rationalising qualities and economic efficacy of the unitarist, centralising route, compared to the delayed and “mediaevalising” constitutionalist and confederal model. The second is the criticism of this model for being a feudal, oligarchic and corrupt system. And finally, this Spanish nationalist historiographic discourse has striven to minimise or conceal the fact that

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it was forcibly imposed, along with the historical resistances it has generated.

Many of the premises upon which this Spanish deterministic discourse is based may simply be questioned through a Europe-wide comparative historical exercise. The cases of England, Sweden, Holland and the Helvetic Union demonstrate that “old constitutionalism”, in the famous expression coined by Charles H. MacIlwain,⁵ evolved from forms based on shared sovereignty towards republican models or models of parliamentary monarchy, and finally to liberal democratic regimes through longer or shorter transitional periods.⁶ In economics, for example, as demonstrated by comparing the history of France and England during the 18th century, by making political contracts more reliable, the representative and parliamentary systems paved the way for much more modern economic relations and lower bank interest rates, which offered better conditions for economic growth.⁷ European historiography in recent decades has also revealed the political role of parliamentary assemblies in the Middle Ages and modern centuries, stressing their values of representativeness and defence of much more horizontal interests than those held by monarchies with absolutist leanings, which adopt much more pyramidal and oligarchic forms of government.⁸

What is more, the results of the Catalan historiographic research which has examined this historical period in recent years have directly and severely questioned the assumptions of Spanish nationalist determinism. Thus, numerous studies have revealed the evolutionary capacity of the institutions in the Catalan pactist system in both theory and political practice.⁹ The heavy aristocratisation of municipal governments after the Nueva Planta Decree has apparently been demonstrated, which in turn marginalised the urban mesocracies that had traditionally been represented.¹⁰ In the realm of economic history, today we know conclusively that the economic upswing of the late Modern Age did not stem from the Bourbon administrative reforms but from the specialisation and intensification of agriculture and manufacturing, as well as from the ties that Catalan trade had forged with the major circuits of world trade. All of these processes had gotten underway before the arrival of the Bourbons.¹¹ Likewise, several studies have shown the high degree of violence and repression used to impose the Spanish unifying model *manu militari*.¹² Most of these studies have simply been ignored by Spanish nationalist historiography, which is why we believe that the interpretative synthesis offered in this article is not a stretch in its attempt to analyse several key issues in the process of constructing the modern Spanish state during this period.

TWO DIVERGENT MODELS OF STATE: ABSOLUTISM AND CONSTITUTIONALISM

Absolutism and constitutionalism have become two “strong” historiographic concepts in defining trends in

Western political thinking in the early Modern Age. However, we should bear in mind that these concepts are neologisms coined in the 18th century and that they are far from being – in both theory and in the practice of government – contrasting or incompatible systems, as it might seem from the subsequent simplification and use of them. Absolutism and constitutionalism were two branchings from the same trunk – the regimen of *res publica* – which also had many other branches and intermediate “accents”.

Specifically, with regard to Spanish political thinking during the reign of the Hapsburgs, the classic dichotomy between Catalan-Aragonese constitutionalism and Castilian absolutism has been further nuanced and enriched. Since the 1980s, a series of historians has noted the existence of a constitutionalist current linked to changes in the tax system which were introduced in the Crown of Castile late in the reign of Philip II; this Castilian constitutionalist thinking emerged among the urban oligarchies and connected with the spirit of reform and regeneration in a society and economy that had fallen into a grave crisis.¹³ However, this is not incompatible with the fact that among the Castilian governing class linked to the central administration of the monarchy – especially among the intelligentsia at court – ideals with absolutist and uniformising tendencies took root that would dovetail with the authoritarian principles of monarchic power already developed in the Castile governed by the Trastámara dynasty but that were now renewed and strengthened by the modern influences of Machiavelli, Lips and especially Bodin.¹⁴

The thesis of sovereignty put forth by Jean Bodin and other theoreticians of absolute monarchy only sparked arguments to reinforce the legitimacy of a royal power with absolutist tendencies which had a longstanding doctrinal tradition in Castile that can be dated back to the reign of Alphonse X. After all, despite the existence of political and legal thinking that was critical – or relatively critical – of the idea that the monarch was above positive law and that he could therefore legislate and grant privileges at will, the *communis opinio* of the doctrine of Castilian policy in the late Modern Age was that the sovereign was only limited by divine law, natural law and the law of nations.¹⁵

In short, in Castile, and more precisely in the monarchy’s spheres of central power, authoritarian and absolutist trends would end up being imposed in both theory and political practice. This would also have repercussions on the monarchy as a whole, given that if institutional diversity is viewed as a source of weakness, respect for the forms of government local to each kingdom or province would be questioned¹⁶ and attempts would be made to introduce the political underpinnings of Castilian law there.¹⁷

However, the interplay of balances and imbalances between king and kingdom would follow quite different evolutions in modern times in the different kingdoms




Figure 1. Compilation of the legislation agreed to by the Courts of Catalonia until the laws enacted in 1634. 1704 edition.

and provinces that made up the composite monarchies. Thus, the political and ideological principles of Catalan-Aragonese pactism evolved in a direction completely different to the theorisations of the Castilian court. In Aragon and Catalonia, especially after the late decades of the 16th century, the legalist formulations of the legal consultants found new elements in the historic discourse to invigorate contractualist approaches. Specifically, the myth of the *furs* (codes of law) of Sobrarb and a new story on the Carolingian origins of Catalonia enabled them to build ideological and juridical elaborations that would provide arguments and political fuel to the movements of 1591 and 1640.¹⁸

In Catalonia, as is known, the thesis of corporate sovereignty had been assimilated back in the 13th century, and in the Late Middle Ages, jurists like Jaume Callís disseminated the idea of the *res publica* as a “mystical body” which placed the prince at the helm and his vassals as the members.¹⁹ This corporatist discourse, however, embodied a tension between the two poles of legitimacy (king and community), a tension that was reflected in the heated controversy over the conception and nature of the assembly representing the community, the Courts.

This pactist or contractualist conception of power, which can be summarised in the formula “king and par-

liament”, gained an important theoretical alternative after the late 16th century. According to the increasingly clear perception of the strength of corporate assemblies and, in short, political communities in many parts of Europe, especially in England,²⁰ in Catalonia a new conception of corporate sovereignty was also introduced which can be summarised in the formula “*rex in curiae*”, which is equivalent to the English “*King in Parliament*”. According to this theorisation, the king was encompassed by a body from which he could not be distinguished and in which his power was subsumed. This formula, which in turn allowed for a variety of interpretations (more or less restrictive with regard to royal power), can be noted in Catalonia in the works of Antoni Oliba, Andreu Bosc and especially Joan Pere Fontanella. The latter, drawing inspiration from the Aragonese jurist Pedro Luis Martínez, as well as from Francisco Suárez, stated that the supreme power did not fall in the king’s hands but in the king along with the branches or estates.²¹

However, on the threshold in the Revolution of 1640, the issue of the locus of sovereignty would develop an even more ground-breaking proposition: the thesis of original popular sovereignty, which would place the Catalan community, not the prince nor the community-prince binomial, at the legitimising core of sovereignty.

The populist theory of the source of the state’s power which had originally been formulated by authors like Francesc Eiximenis back in late mediaeval political thinking mainly reached Catalonia in the 17th century through the iusnaturalist populism from the 16th century Castilian scholasticists such as the Jesuit Francisco Suárez. They envisioned the state as a natural community that emerged from the social impetus of a collective that transferred power in order to fulfil its needs for defence and protection, while reserving freedom and sovereignty for itself.²²

The principle that sovereignty *naturally* belonged to the community and that it could never abdicate this sovereignty was put forth by authors like Joan Pere Fontanella, Francesc Martí Viladamor and Acaci Ripoll in the legal-political treatises of the 1630s and 1640s. On the eve of 1640, the representative and parliamentary political principles (as well as the concept of popular sovereignty, the idea of an elective monarchy and the right of resistance) were rather deeply rooted in the Catalan body politic, and latent within them was the option of a parliamentary monarchy or even a fully republican option.²³

In addition to the topic of the locus of sovereignty, the other key question in Catalan political thinking in the early Modern Age was the definition of the political community or the type of territorial state. However, we should recall that this topic was particularly complex given the “composite” or “segmented” nature of the majority of political formations in mediaeval and Renaissance Europe.

Generally speaking, the constitutionalist avenue of thought advocated a territorial model of state that recognised the institutional diversity of the historical formations that comprised it, while in the majority of cases the



Figure 2. Monument to the jurist and politician Joan-Pere Fontanella (Olot, 1575 - Perpignan, 1649) in Olot, the city of his birth. It is the work of sculptor Miquel Blai.

absolutist and pro-uniformity tendencies were tamped down, since institutional diversity was interpreted as an obstacle to the strengthening of royal power.

It should be noted that there is no dearth of exceptions to this rule. Thus, a supporter of placing limits on monarchic power, Juan de Mariana, who even advocated tyrannicide, was, in contrast, a supporter of Spanish institutional unity.²⁴ Likewise, we can find several theoreticians from the Crown of Aragon who upheld moderate regionalism (such as the Valencians Cristòfor Crespí de Vallaura and Llorenç Mateu i Sanz) while at the same time defending the local codes of law, privileges and institutions of each kingdom.²⁵

Early modern Catalan political thinking advocated, with only a handful of exceptions, even among the most royalist authors,²⁶ an institutionally plural model of state. However, it should be noted that the mixture of the constitutional model of the exercise of power (which stipulated control of executive power according to representative assemblies) and the “confederal” model of the definition of state created ambiguities and problems that were not always thoroughly addressed or resolved in the constitutionalist theorisations.

There were essentially two problems: *a*) How to define – especially in view of international policy – an executive power shared by quasi-independent historical formations and at the same time by distinct geopolitical, economic and other interests, and *b*) how to adapt this model of state to growth through new territorial acquisitions from

either marital ties or conquest. The case of the Spanish monarchy, which joined the Crowns of Aragon and Castile, the Portuguese empire and other territories, may be paradigmatic of this issue. The response to these questions in terms of political theory was the development of representative federal bodies (Courts of the monarchy and a kind of “council of councils”), which Diego Saavedra y Fajardo noted in the mid-17th century and which the Aragonese exiled Austriacist Juan Amor de Soria theorised more fully in the 18th century.²⁷

CENTRE AND PERIPHERY: THE ESCALATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL TENSIONS

The inclusion of the Catalan historical formation with mediaeval roots in a large “composite monarchy”, namely the Spanish Hapsburg monarchy, poses a historical dialectic between political “centre” and “periphery”, which, far from being particular or exceptional, was rather common in Europe during the early centuries of modernity.²⁸

It should first be noted that this relationship cannot only be conceived in terms of confrontation or political subordination, or simply based on the existence of a dichotomy between two compact poles of power: court and country. Yet nor should we forget the dynamic, not static, nature of the dialectic between the centre of the Spanish monarchy, the Castilian Court, and Catalonia, since this relationship went through a wide variety of circumstances in terms of the evolution in the human and material forces, the ideological elaborations, the social balances and imbalances and the international political contexts. Finally, we should also note that the political dialectic of the kingdoms and provinces on the periphery arose not only with the central government of the monarchy; rather especially in border provinces like Catalonia, there were also interrelations between them and neighbouring powers, France in this case.

However, these considerations do not belie the idea that there was almost permanent constitutional tension between centre and periphery given that their divergent conceptualisations on the model of state, as outlined above, would clash in political practice both when establishing the scope and limits of the jurisdiction of monarchic power and when defining and carrying out directives aimed at constructing a territorial state capable of being consolidated and conserved through the agitated, divided Europe of the early centuries of modernity.

The latest studies on the 16th century in Catalonia are making it increasingly clear that the political-constitutional edifice built since the late 15th-century reign of Ferdinand the Catholic soon revealed itself to be too fragile and precarious to ensure a correspondence or collaboration between the Catalans and the Crown. Back in the reign of Charles I and in the early years of Phillip II, the constitutional tensions blossomed in a variety of spheres. The institutional conflicts motivated by the royal officials’

violations of the constitution and the inoperativeness of the constitution of “Observança” approved in the Courts of Barcelona of 1480-1481 were coupled with jurisdictional clashes with the Tribunal of the Inquisition and the violence stemming from the presence of Spanish soldiers in the Principality. Likewise, since the 1420s, imperial policy in the Mediterranean had been seriously thwarting Catalan mercantile interests.²⁹

This constitutional conflict would continue in the second half of the 16th century with two remarkable milestones: the confrontation between the Generalitat and the Crown in 1568-1569, which led to the imprisonment of deputies for having refused to contribute to paying the “excusat”,³⁰ and especially the disturbances during the period 1587-1593. These latter events have been interpreted by the most recent Catalan historiography as a key juncture in the “political fracture” between Catalonia and the Hapsburg dynasty, which would place the relations between king and kingdom on the road towards the Revolution of 1640.³¹

The episodes of upheaval in 1587-1593 had major political and legal implications, since they entailed questioning the pre-eminence of royal jurisdiction in Catalonia and served as the catalyst for other constitutional disputes on the king’s *potestas iuriscendi* which would be put into place until the Revolution of 1640. Based on chapters 7 and 34 of the government’s new reform approved by the Courts of 1585, the interpretation was made that the *divuitenes*³² not only were charged with declaring violations of the constitutions but also had the authority to make legal annotations and issue the corresponding sanctions, bypassing the authority of the Audience (the highest court in Catalonia). To the Council of Aragon, the viceroys and the Audience, the proceedings regarding the violations of the constitutions undertaken by the *divuitenes* cast doubt on royal authority in the Principality and could even be considered a crime of *lèse-majesté*. In contrast, to the defenders of the laws and institutions of the land, they were the constitutional mechanism which was meant to ensure the regime’s compliance with the constitutions on which the Catalan political community was grounded, given the inoperativeness of the constitution of “Observança”.

During that period, the Catalan Diputació, traditionally made up of three deputies, one from each branch (Church, military or nobility, and royal or urban), and socially bolstered by the Juntres de Braços (boards of members from all three branches) and the *divuitenes* created by virtue of the *nou redreç* (new reform) of the Courts of 1585, entered a spiral of confrontations with the institutions representing royal power in Catalonia, especially with the third court of the Audience. These clashes culminated in May 1591, when the viceregal guard tried to capture the military (i.e., noble) deputy, Joan Granollacs, an attempt that failed due to the deputy’s resistance and the grassroots support he received. Granollacs and the supporters of confronting the abuses of royal jurisdiction

closed the Palau de la Generalitat for almost eleven months. However, ultimately, the fear that the events in Catalonia might end through the same military might that Philip II had wielded in the altercations in Aragon – which led to the execution of the Aragonese justice Juan de Lanuza, among other actions – dissolved the resistance from the Catalan institutions. On the 22nd of February 1593, the Catalan institutions were notified of the suspension of chapters 7, 13 and 34 of the *nou redreç* from the Courts of 1585. This laws issued by the king and the branches was unilaterally suspended via a Royal Pragmatic. However, there was repression in the guise of legal proceedings against the people associated with the Diputació and the *divuitenes*, some of whom, such as the military deputy Joan Granollacs, would choose the pathway of exile to avoid arrest.

Thus, at least after the Courts of 1595, a heated jurisdictional conflict was unleashed in which the king believed that the actions of the Catalan institutions usurped different facets of royal jurisdiction, while the leaders of the institutions in the Principality believed that the Crown’s actions contravened the constitutions and laws agreed to between king and kingdom, which were the higher underpinning of the Catalan *res publica*, as explicitly stated in the royal oath.³³ Far from interpreting each other as complementary forces with common interests and reciprocal correspondences, each saw the other as a hindrance or obstacle to their ideals and interests.

The rapprochement of the Courts of 1599, in which the flood of noble appointments by the king was answered by the granting of a donation of 1,100,000 pounds, was a fleeting mirage. The ministry of the Duke of Lerma’s intention was that five constitutions should appear in the legislative corpus that was to be printed from the sessions of the Courts. These constitutions were questioned by the Generalitat and the military branch, which unleashed yet another bitter institutional and legal dispute that led to the imprisonment of the military deputy and auditor.³⁴

In the opinion of John H. Elliott, one of the fundamental keys to explaining the clash between the Catalan institutions and the central government of the Spanish monarchy in the decades prior to the Revolution of 1640 was the difficulty of combining respect for the “legality” of the constitutions with the “needs” arising from political practice. In the early decades of the 17th century, the clearest expression of this contradiction was the issue of the repression of banditry. According to Elliott, the vicerealties of the Dukes of Alburquerque and Alcalá (1615-1621) were a time of the “restoration of government” given that the stringent, anti-constitutional methods of these Castilian viceroys – including the large-scale razing of homes and castles – along with the urbanisation of the nobility, had been a key factor in the “domestication” of the Catalan aristocracy, distancing it from the feudal-style private wars.³⁵

To what extent was the disorder and violence that Catalonia experienced in around 1615 the result of a system of

laws and constitutions at the “service” of a feudal oligarchy? The English historian’s answer is rather conclusive on this issue: “The much-vaunted freedoms of the Principality, far from being a guarantee of political freedom and the social order, had become an invitation to license”.³⁶

Unquestionably, inasmuch as certain rights or privileges, such as the right to bear arms or the recourse to violence as a means of exercising certain seigniorial prerogatives, were part of the laws and constitutions of Catalonia, there could be a mixture or superimposition of the exercise of aristocratic privileges and an abuse of the freedoms of the “land”. However, I believe it would be risky to attribute all the political and social upheaval – in which certain bandit lords were unquestionably involved – to a specific social class, and even more erroneous to relate it to the system of laws and constitutions of the country, which, lest we forget it, included a much broader swath of society than just the noble class.

This is because, though it is true that the constitutions of Catalonia may have been an instrument to safeguard certain private or estate interests, it is equally true that they upheld many general and community interests which were often trampled upon by the same royal officials who were fighting the bandit lords. The attacks on the communities that destabilised the social order could just as easily have come from the violence exercised by the bandit lords as by the violence waged by the king’s troops and officials, and we should also add that the tensions caused by the viceroys’ actions not only stemmed from the repression of banditry or the Castilian Spanish state’s mechanisms of extortion but also from certain attempts to politically and nationally pervert the Catalan community.³⁷

Likewise, as Eva Serra has noted, the Catalan petty aristocracy’s conflict with the Crown was motivated not only by the criminalisation of the ban on the noble estate but also by the displacement or neglect of its leading role in political life. The viceroys’ repeated violations of the constitutional laws were, among other things, an attack on the political order of the Catalan community, in which the military (nobility) was given a prominent public function.³⁸

In the constitutional conflict of 1621-1622 over the oath of Philip IV, the rancour that had been gathering for years among Catalonia’s petty aristocracy finally surfaced, as their pride as a leading class had been injured, especially during the viceroalties of Albuquerque and Alcalá. The offensive from the institutions of the country, which claimed that Lieutenants Alcalá and Sentís could not act in their posts until the new monarch swore to observe the privileges and constitutions of the Principality, unleashed major institutional tensions that were accompanied by a sweeping constitutional debate that has been compared to the one that took place in the kingdom of Bohemia in 1619, when its estates deposed Ferdinand II and chose the Palatine elector Frederick in his place.³⁹

Clearly, a mixture of the defence of particular class interests and general ideals regarding the desire to move to-

wards a pactist model of state can explain both the upheaval of 1621-1622 and the Catalan ruling class’s steadfast resistance to the absolutist reformism advocated by the ministry of Olivares, which became clear in the failure of the Courts of 1626-1632.⁴⁰

We should also note that the economic differences that may have existed between the king and the Catalan branches on the question of donations were only a reflection of a much deeper political and constitutional divergence. In the Courts sessions of 1626-1632, the gap separating the absolutist reformism of the ministry of Count-Duke Olivares and the renewed Catalan constitutionalism became clear in terms of the reforms of the constitution of the “Observança”, the attempts to scale back the jurisdiction of the Tribunal of the Inquisition, the control of the *quint* of municipal taxes and the articulation of the monarchy through the projection of the “Unió d’Armes” (a contingent of troops that was supposed to maintain Catalonia, Valencia and Aragon).

The failure of the Courts of 1626-1632 led two ideas on the political dynamic of the Principality to take root among the government circles of the monarchy. The first was that the constitutionalist bent of the Catalan institutions, as well as the desire for self-government among Catalonia’s ruling class, were opposed to the basic principles that should prevail to ensure the monarchy’s sound governance. The second was that the political mechanisms were already incapable of correcting or reconducting this situation, and that therefore to avoid greater evils, the combined use of force and politics must be imposed.

The strategy of calling the Courts accompanied by the presence of an army had been broadly debated in the boards and councils of the monarchy since 1632.⁴¹ To some government ministries, it was necessary to first “conquer” Catalonia and then call the Courts, as Philip II had done with the Aragonese, while to others, the intimidating presence of an army would be enough to ensure the Catalan branches’ submission to royal will. However, a detailed examination of these deliberations reveals that there was widespread consensus among the Court ministers on the need for the combined use of force and politics to modify the constitutional balance inherited from the dynastic union of the Catholic Kings. The discrepancies only lay in whether or not to do it at a time when this internal constitutional problem might be mixed with the overarching conflict over European hegemony that the Spanish and French powers were facing. And as is known, this was the strategy ultimately chosen by the ministry of Count-Duke Olivares to put an end to what was considered a rebellion by the Catalans in the summer of 1640.

In short, the political theorisations with unitarist and absolutist tendencies that dominated at the heart of the Castilian court were accompanied by initiatives in the realm of political practice which advocated a combined use of force and politics. This, in our opinion, radically questions the line of interpretation which has recently upheld the existence of a Spanish imperial ideology, sup-

ported on the concept of a “monarchy of Spain” particularly after the reign of Philip II, which would have the benefit of guaranteeing the freedoms and privileges of the territories in it.⁴²

A RULING CLASS DISTANT FROM THE THRONE

One of the decisive features of the political dialectic between Catalonia and the Spanish Hapsburg monarchy was the weakness of the Catalan ruling class’ adherence to the royal power. It should be noted that the most recent historiography on the formation of the modern state has stressed not only that was it difficult to govern against the provincial ruling classes but that it was also difficult to govern without their support.⁴³

In the history of early modern Catalonia, one very important factor was that the two institutions at the helm of the political life of the Principality – the Consell de Cent (Council of One Hundred) and the Generalitat – had a shared social base of power: the new Barcelona-based ruling class that had taken shape since the late 15th century. The urbanised petty nobility, honorary citizens, merchants and canons of Barcelona, as well as some rising liberal professionals, especially doctors and judges, made up a highly cohesive ruling class which at that time dominated both institutions and steered the fates of Barcelona and Catalonia as a whole.⁴⁴ Even though at certain times the Crown intentionally strove to break this institutional alliance, and there was no dearth of friction or jurisdictional competition between both institutions, there was generally shared alignment on the issues that affected the underpinnings of the Catalan pactist regime.

This Barcelona-based ruling class was a “composite” elite. Its fundamental core was the urban patricians, the so-called honorary citizens, that is, citizens who were distinguished by their political and economic status, whose rank equalled that of the nobility through a privilege issued by Ferdinand II in 1510. However, this Barcelona-based ruling class was bolstered by the addition of members from both the upper and lower echelons of the body politic. First, it included members of the traditional Catalan nobility – nobles and knights – who had been involved in an intense process of urbanisation since the late 15th century. James Amelang has discussed a “great compromise” through which, between the 16th and early 17th centuries, there was an exchange of social status (the nobility facilitated the aristocratisation of the urban patricians) for power (the honorary citizens allowed the nobility into politics and local government posts).⁴⁵

However, the Barcelona-based ruling class also had institutional mechanisms in place that made it possible for individuals from the middle class to join it, especially merchants, jurists and doctors. The status of honorary citizen could be acquired either through the system of cooptation, which expanded the rolls of honorary citizens through assemblies held by the patricians every year, or

by the citizenship patents granted by the monarch. In short, unlike other European urban oligarchies, the Barcelona elite was open, or at least relatively open.⁴⁶

Even though there was no dearth of factional partisanship, the Barcelona-based ruling class was highly cohesive through a constant dynamic of marriage ties among its members, as well as by its firm – though not exclusive – social control over the most important Catalan institutions and shared models of political education and culture. The inclusion of numerous family lineages of jurists, as well as the promotion of legal studies among the ranks of the nobility, contributed to strengthening and disseminating among these elites the values of the pactist political model which had secular roots in the production of Catalan law.⁴⁷

The royal power orphaned this ruling class from “service” and “reward”, as the weakness of royal patronage in Catalonia seems beyond dispute. J. H. Elliott noted the extraordinary precariousness of the posts that the viceroyal administration made available to a ruling class which was comprised of around 780 people in around 1626. According to this English historian: “It is doubtful whether the central administration had more than twelve posts for members of the aristocracy”, which, to make matters worse, were very poorly compensated economically.⁴⁸ The weak status of the structure of the royal administration in Catalonia bore a close relationship to the king’s scant tax and capital resources there. In the early 17th century, the viceroyal administration’s annual revenues were around 37,000 pounds, which were joined by the 10,000 more that the Diputació contributed to pay the judges and functionaries of the Royal Audience. However, these figures were insufficient since the Crown had to supply 19,000 more pounds from the outside in order to meet the salaries of the viceroys (around 6,000 pounds) and to balance the budget.⁴⁹

Outside of Catalonia, the Catalan ruling class’s prospects for enjoying royal patronage were hardly better. Neither a military career nor a post in the civil administration of the central government of the monarchy was an easy, generous means of ascent for this Catalan ruling class. Nor were the *encomiendas* of the major military orders, which were theoretically open to all subjects of the King of Spain, a means of integration and compensation for the members of the Catalan ruling class. In the early 17th century, only 17 of the 1,452 members of the Orders of Alcántara, Calatrava and Santiago were Catalonia natives, that is, less than one percent. As J. H. Elliott noted, “If there was a ‘Spanish’ aristocracy, the Catalans were not part of it”.⁵⁰

However, the issue of patronage was really only a reflection of a much deeper political issue: the inability of the central government of the Spanish monarchy to establish acceptable levels of integration, communication and political consensus with the Catalan ruling class. The case of the France of Richelieu, Mazzarino and Colbert has been held up as an example of the efficacy of royal patronage – centralised, in this case – which succeeded in the objectives of achieving control over the provinces of

the kingdom while also knitting solid ties between the monarchy and the numerous regional elites, thus strengthening the absolutist and centralising trends of the Bourbon monarchy.⁵¹

The Hapsburg monarchy never managed to forge minimally solid and socially widespread ties of patronage, communication and political influence in Catalonia. The attempts to build these ties via members of the Court like Pere de Franquesa and Salvador Fontanet never managed to achieve either solidity or continuity. However, the attempts to articulate a pro-royal nucleus based on family clans located in the Principality, such as the Marimons, never managed to take hold either, nor did enlisting the services of the upper aristocracy, the Duke of Cardona, to attain the interests and designs of the Crown.⁵²

The political marginalisation of the Catalan ruling class and the Crown's loss of support in the Principality were the flip sides of the same coin. Yet this same period also witnessed a strengthening of the local institutions, which were primarily controlled by the ruling class. Especially after the second half of the 16th century, the *Diputació del General* and the *Consell de Cent* became more representative of the Catalan community and less representative of royal power. The strengthening of these institutions – administratively, symbolically and in other spheres – as well as the *Generalitat's* promotion of a tax and finance system enabled it to weave a web of interests and complicities around it that extended to broad swaths of Catalan society.⁵³ This process reinforced the sense of public responsibility among the Catalan ruling class, making them aware of their steering role in the community of “Catalans” while also creating a hierarchy of loyalties in which the duty to the laws and institutions of the land would be increasingly preminent.

If we focus on the members of the ruling core in the Revolution of 1640, we can note these individuals' strong ties with the local institutions. Many of them were members of the military branch while also occupying posts in the *Diputació* and *Consell de Cent* in a continuous and/or intergenerational fashion. This contrasts with the volatile or spasmodic nature of their ties with the Crown. In fact, the “rupture” with royal power was common ground among many members of this leading core of the Revolution of 1640, since even though their grandparents or progenitors had been members of the Royal Audience or the Council of Aragon, they were now at the spearhead of a process of rupture with the Spanish monarchy.⁵⁴ Just as with Barcelona's entire ruling class, and Catalonia's ruling class in general, the elements of their political adherence with the Crown were inconsistent and lacked continuity.

THE RUPTURE OF 1640

The military factor ultimately provided the fuse and spark that led the longstanding institutional and jurisdictional tensions to explode. After 1635, the French-Spanish

struggle for hegemony in Europe turned Catalonia into the war front and parade grounds of the Catholic monarchy. Instead of getting the Catalans to adhere to the imperial designs of Olivares and Philip IV, as many ministers at court wished, this only sparked new constitutional tensions that derived from the irregular billeting of the troops, the illegal mobilisations of the local people and the tax burdens imposed beyond the constitutional limits. After the three-year period of 1638-1641, the *Diputació*, led by the Canon of Urgell, Pau Claris, started to publicly denounce the throngs and excesses brought about by the massive military presence in the villages and universities of the Principality and countships, which, though not unknown in the past, was now extraordinary in its impact and magnitude.⁵⁵

The political blindness of Olivares' ministry, which was also pressuring the city of Barcelona with disproportionate and unconstitutional tax demands, ended up leading the two most important Catalan institutions to join forces into a united front against royal policy. This convergence, which was highly visible after January-February 1639, would not be undone during that three-year period and would culminate with the revolutionary process of 1640-1641, an institutional agreement through which Pau Claris would become the political leader of the Catalan ruling class.⁵⁶

The French invasion of Roussillon in June 1639 first led to the fall of Salses and later to a long and costly campaign to win back this fortress perched just over the bor-




Figure 3. Pau Claris i Casademunt (Barcelona, 1586-1641), 94th President of the *Generalitat de Catalunya*. Image from an engraving from the work *Barcelona Ancient and Modern* by Andreu Avel·lí Pi i Arimon, published in 1854.

der.⁵⁷ In the approximately seven months that this military episode lasted, the relations between the institutions and royal power deteriorated extraordinarily, and by January 1640 Olivares' ministry seemed to have forgotten all the norms of political caution in Catalonia. During the ensuing months, it pressured the peasants and lower class to billet the troops, which was not only exceedingly unconstitutional but was also harrowing for villages which had already suffered greatly. Simultaneously, Olivares' ministry also made a series of arrests, striving to decapitate – at least politically – the Catalan leaders who had proven to be the most staunchly opposed to the central government's directives.

The first reaction to this strategy was vehement social outcry. It was initially anti-military and anti-tax, but it soon took on the guise of a class conflict,⁵⁸ and the religious tone that the protest soon adopted led it to gain momentum in society.⁵⁹

However, the directives of Olivares' ministry also prompted a political response which led the Catalan leaders, using the force of the popular uprising, to release the military deputy Francesc Tamarit and other prisoners on the 22nd of May 1640. This episode was a milestone in the process of rupture between the Madrid government and the Catalan ruling class, a process that would ultimately prove to be irreversible.⁶⁰ Firstly, Olivares and the ministers of Court interpreted those deeds as an unequivocal sign of political rebellion, and thereafter they determined that military intervention was the best means of redressing the situation in Catalonia. Likewise, and this demonstrates that both sides were aware of the political significance of the episode, Pau Claris and Olivares immediately embarked upon separate secret negotiations with France, Catalonia with the goal of exploring the possibility of securing French military aid should a bloody battle with the Court of Madrid ensue, and Spain, which contacted Richelieu, despite the war, to neutralise this potential scenario.⁶¹

The events that transpired on the day of "Corpus de Sang" (Bloody Corpus Christi, 7th of June), with the death of the viceroy-count of Santa Coloma and the persecution of the judges of the Audience, along with the occurrences in Perpignan between the 13th and 15th of the same month, with the bombardment, burning and pillaging of the city by Spanish troops, only served to widen the abyss that opened in late May. With the aim of gaining time to prepare military intervention measures against Catalonia, the Court of Madrid implemented a policy of concealing its repressive intentions, although the Catalan leaders were not hoodwinked.⁶²

This twofold game being played by the central government of the monarchy even further hindered any political rapprochement between both sides, since, once the leaders of the Principality became aware of it their conviction that the intentions of Olivares' ministry were implacably repressive was only strengthened. Thereafter, while Madrid viewed military control of the province as a neces-

sary requirement in order to restore justice and royal authority, to the Catalan ruling classes being freed from military bondage was the only reliable guarantee of both safeguarding the people from the troops and guaranteeing the freedoms and constitutions of their own political system, as well as avoiding a kind of personal and institutional repression which, to their minds, had already been decided upon in government circles.

In mid-August 1640, when the preparations for the army that was supposed to invade Catalonia were already well underway, Philip IV and Olivares publicised this decision along with the monarch's intention to travel to the Principality to hold Courts and "to restore the trampled justice". Pau Claris' political response was twofold and trenchant: first, he reactivated the negotiations with France in order to secure military aid, and secondly, using the same argument of restoring "trampled justice", he called a meeting of the Junta General de Braços to legitimise and organise the armed resistance to the invasion that had been publicly announced by the Court of Madrid.

However, it should be noted that the first and most desired option for the majority of Catalan leaders was not "separatist" and, in fact, they devised a strategy that included trying to convince Philip IV to desist in his military invasion of Catalonia (by striving to show an inflated military strength that would be reinforced by French military aid). The best option in the minds of the Catalan leaders was to remain the vassals of the Catholic King while saving the land from the hordes of soldiers and ensuring its political system of freedoms and constitutions. Once they were convinced that this would be impossible as long as Olivares and Jerónimo Villanueva were steering the Court's affairs, they strove to unseat them with an intense letter- and report-writing campaign that culminated in the publication and dissemination of the *Proclamación Católica* commissioned to the skilled polemicist Gaspar Sala, which explicitly called for Olivares' removal from office.⁶³ However, the roots of the political and ideological directives issuing from the government circles (basically reinforcing royal authority and eliminating the roadblocks of any intermediate power in the governance of the monarchy) ran much deeper than what could be derived from the stance of some ministers, the reason this strategy failed.

When Pau Claris called the meeting of the Junta General de Braços on the 10th of September 1640, the Catalan revolutionary process actually got underway, and although in political theory it did not take on an explicitly republican guise, since it simply rendered royal sovereignty idle, in political practice, it did act as a fully sovereign power. Between the 10th of September 1640 and the 30th of December 1641 – the date when Louis XIII took his oath on the laws and constitutions of the Principality through Marshal Brezé – the institutional representatives of the Catalan branches appointed officials to impart justice and administer the land; they recruited and organised



Figure 4. Cover of one of the propaganda books on the 1640 Catalan uprising written by Friar Gaspar Sala.

a Catalan militia; they implemented and collected new taxes; they coined money; and they turned themselves over to the sovereignty of Louis XIII of France after having broken the bonds of loyalty that bound them to Philip VI.

In the initial impetus of this “republican moment”, Pau Claris focused on enlisting broad swaths of the Catalan body politic by notably expanding the urban and village mesocracies in the popular branch in the Junta General de Braços. To the leaders who had been at the helm of the revolutionary movement, this was both a means of portraying political strength to the Court of Madrid and a way of legitimising and binding most of the villages to the resistance against the royal armies.

Despite the efforts made by the Catalan institutions to organise a military force capable of handling the army almost 30,000 men strong commanded by the Marquis of Los Vélez which threatened to invade Catalonia from the line of Aragon and Valencia, this goal was impossible to reach. Setting up administrative, military and financial structures strong enough to sustain a large-scale war required time, not to mention levels of experience and accumulations of capital that were unavailable at that time. The Spanish army’s violent entrance into the lands of the Ebro River swiftly revealed both Catalonia’s military weakness and the aggressive and repressive aims guiding the Spanish intervention.⁶⁴

The alliance with France and the liberating victory on Montjuïc (26th of January 1641) would destroy all of the ministry of Olivares’ political and military calculations, since now it was clear that the Catalans’ rebellion would not be easily snuffed out, while it also became clear that the army would be unable to reach the western side of the peninsula to put down the rebellion that had broken out in Portugal on the 1st of December 1640.

FROM 1640 TO 1714: WARS AND “NATIONAL” SHOCK. THE CATALAN CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY IN THE GAME OF EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

The Catalan ruling class’s resistance to the absolutist reformism of the ministry of Count-Duke Olivares and Catalonia’s entry in the great arena of European international politics after its 1640-1641 rupture with the Spanish monarchy had major repercussions on both the process of constructing the modern Spanish state and the balance of international relations in 17th century Europe.

Internally in Spain, the Catalans’ rebellion destroyed the projects being devised by the intelligentsia at the Castilian Court since the late 16th century, which Olivares’ reformist policy of constructing the base of a Spanish state in the former Iberia that was institutionally compact and, at least in the long-term, had a unitary identity, was seeking to put into practice, at least partly. The long, bloody war to “win back” Catalonia from 1640-1652 laid a depth charge to the project of constructing the modern Spanish state, as it broke the bonds of political trust between the Castilian centre and the historical Catalan formation. The perceptions of the causes and development of the process of rupture were different, yet they all led to a feeling of distance and mistrust. In Castile, and especially in the Castilian court, the Catalan and Portuguese rebellion rendered it impossible to establish that compact, well-built, cohesive state designed and run by Castile. In Catalonia, the Spanish unifying project dreamt up by the intelligentsia at court and tested by Olivares had revealed itself to be aggressive and unilateral, as it attacked the Catalan political and national identity. What Olivares had advocated in his 1624 *Gran memorial* as an ideal or a horizon to attain among the king’s Spanish subjects – the rapprochement of their desires and feelings so that Spain could become a political and national community – was more of a pipe dream than ever.

Although it permeated the political and intellectual debate at the time, the identity factor (with the interplay of Catalonia-Castile-Spain as the fundamental referents) was not what triggered the Revolt of Catalonia of 1640-1652. However, once the hostilities had begun, the “national” factor took on extraordinary momentum and size. The experience of confrontation between “natives” and “invaders”, the spiral of violence and repression and the stimulus of feelings of hatred and separation through war propaganda and the moral and religious sanctions issued by the Church against the outside oppressors largely fed Catalan society with strong Catalan-Spanish and Catalan-French counter-identities.⁶⁵

In fact, a kind of concatenation or reaction had been unleashed that survived until the end of the War of the Spanish Succession. The political conceptualisation of Spain and the absolutist tendencies of the central government nurtured unifying policies that came upon vigorous resistance in the Catalan political community, which had

matured its own institutional, symbolic-identity and cultural referents during that period. The Spanish military presence in the land sought to achieve the objectives and ideals of a faraway dynasty and a Castilianised political centre, but what it actually fostered was precisely a “national” shock that made any project aimed at identity unification even more unfeasible.

Likewise, in international politics, the Catalans’ revolutionary rupture in 1640-1641 weakened Spain’s positions in other spheres of conflict. The fact that the war to “win back” Catalonia was considered a priority for the Court of Madrid facilitated the victory of the Portuguese secessionist coup while also diminishing the human and economic resources assigned by the Spanish power to the Netherlands and Italy, thus contributing to the definitive ascent of France within European hegemony. This was enshrined by the Treaty of the Pyrenees in 1659, which also signalled the partition of Catalonia.

The “return” of Barcelona and most of Catalonia to the Spanish monarchy in October 1652 meant the Catalan institutions’ loss of self-governance. Even though the Court of Madrid considered more stringent repressive options, the continued threat from France meant that the central governing bodies of the monarchy chose to try to control the political life of the Principality by the royal reserve of the vote in the Generalitat and the Consell de Cent, an institutional measure which was combined with a greater Spanish military presence on Catalan soil.⁶⁶ The leaders were periodically chosen based on a census that was called the *Llibre de l’Ànima* (literally “Book of Souls”, or book of potential public servants), and the king gave himself the right to exclude anyone who was considered disaffected.

With the royal reserve on the vote, the goal was to launch political mechanisms in which the key institutions in the Principality would be filled with personnel that were docile to the directives issued by the royal power through the mixture of “rewards” and “punishments”.⁶⁷ However, this would prove to be an unsuccessful means of politically subjugating the Principality. And, in fact, the royal reserve on the vote became a bone of contention which instead of getting the Catalan ruling class to adhere to the political will of the Court of Madrid aroused a spiral of unsatisfied claims and institutional clashes. The aspirations to recover the self-governance lost after the *Guerra dels Segadors* (Reapers’ War, or Catalan Revolt) were never abandoned by institutional leaders who had theoretically been “chosen” or “screened” by the royal power but who would, in fact, become the core of the political claims that linked 1652 to 1705.⁶⁸

Even though Barcelona’s ruling class, and Catalonia’s in general, had suffered from the divisions and ravages of the Spanish monarchy in the years since the War of the Spanish Succession, and despite the fact that this negative experience shaped its subsequent political attitude, this ruling class never abandoned a pactist culture with the self-governance of the Generalitat and the Consell de

Cent at its core. Likewise, as this ruling class was relatively socially open and had the ability to integrate the most dynamic sectors from Catalan society, the claims for self-governance attained widespread support and were not foreign to the groups who spearheaded the economic transformations in the Principality in the second half of the 17th century.⁶⁹

The institutions’ desire to win back self-governance is the key to understanding Catalonia’s support of the Hapsburgs in the War of the Spanish Succession. While in 1640 Catalonia’s involvement in the game of European international politics had come about in an attempt to stop the attacks of Olivares’ absolutist reformism, in 1705 it stemmed from the attempt to recover the self-governance lost since 1652. In this sense, Catalonia’s 1705 stance had not a “Spanish” horizon, as the bulk of Catalan historiography has upheld since Ferran Soldevila (*Vicens Vives*, *Pierre Vilar*, *Joaquim Albareda*, *Josep M. Torras i Ribé* and *Josep Fontana*, among others) but a Catalan “sovereignist” horizon. The purpose of Catalonia’s 1705 stance was to strengthen the freedoms of the pactist system, which had been curtailed since 1652 and constantly abused by the political practices of the central government of the monarchy. Later, based on that and not a “Spanish” agenda, it sought to build its own political and institutional framework which, once the self-governance lost in 1652 was won back, would be capable of giving an outlet to the energies and dynamism of an expanding economy, as Catalonia’s was in the late 17th and early 18th centuries.⁷⁰

Yet again, in around 1705, the violence of war aroused “national”-style tensions on an extraordinary basis. The continuation of the war for almost nine years and the practice of Bourbon “military terrorism” as a strategy to subjugate the peoples once again exacerbated the issue of differing identities.⁷¹ The final stage in the war was particularly fierce, and the propaganda workshops once again fostered and aired the feelings of hatred and separation between the natives and the foreign aggressors.⁷²

However, while anti-France sentiments predominated in 1705-1706, the war mainly took on an anti-Castilian bent in 1712-1714. The emotional and identity-based abyss opened by the violence of war was now coupled with a conscious “national” feeling that was fairly widespread in society, based on a reluctance to see the local institutions and “freedoms” destroyed to be replaced by alien forms of government led by the ministers from the Castilian court.⁷³ The sum and intertwining of these two factors is surely the key to understanding the widespread, steadfast popular support for the heroic struggle of 1713-1714.

The *Onze de Setembre* (11th of September 1714) defeat would lead to the establishment of an absolutist political model in Catalonia, which contrasted with the pactist nature of its own historical tradition. This model reflected the political hallmark of the Bourbon dynasty, but it was also the outcome of ideals that sought to politically and

legally construct a Spanish “union” or nation based on the Castilian model, one which brooked no alternative powers or loyalties.

However, even after the repression of the War of the Spanish Succession and the constant military subjugation of the land, one could still detect unequivocal signs of a persistent Catalan national identity throughout the 18th and early 19th century.⁷⁴ In short, our analysis of the case of Catalonia in relation to the construction of the modern Spanish state demonstrates that, in addition to the cultural, symbolic and economic-tax factors, the very actions aimed at constructing more unified states that embodied hegemonic designs such as Castile’s plan for Spain, often generated strong identity-based reactions by the other communities included within the same political domain, primarily because of the armed conflicts they unleashed. All of these factors together consolidated the shaping of a national identity in some of these communities, such as Catalonia, which would last even after they were dispossessed by the force of their institutional and legislative structures with mediaeval origins.

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- [11] For a territorial breakdown of the Catalan economy, see: Albert GARCIA ESPUCHE. *Un siglo decisivo. Barcelona y Cataluña. 1550-1640*. Alianza, Madrid 1998; Albert GARCIA ESPUCHE. *Barcelona entre dues guerres. Economia i vida quotidiana (1652-1714)*. Eumo, Vic 2005, especially pp. 261-365; Jaume DANTÍ (ed.). *Ciutats, viles i pobles a la xarxa urbana de la Catalunya Moderna*. Rafael Dalmau, Barcelona 2005. Regarding the integration of Catalan commerce into the world circuits, see: Jaume TORRAS ELÍAS. “Productes vitícoles i integració mercantil a Europa, ss. XVI-XVII”. In: *Jornades sobre la viticultura a la conca mediterrània*. Diputació de Tarragona, Tarragona 1995, pp. 527-533; Josep FONTANA. “En els inicis de la Catalunya contemporània: l'economia a la segona meitat del segle XVII”. *Barcelona Quaderns d'Història*, no. 7 (2002), pp. 13-21; Francesc VALLS JUNYENT. *La Catalunya atlàntica: aiguardent i teixits a l'arrencada industrial catalana*. Eumo, Vic 2001; Josep M. TORRAS I RIBÉ. “Els corresponsals del comerç català amb Europa al començament del segle XVIII”. *Recerques*, no. 23 (1990), pp. 115-139. For the transformations of the agrarian and manufacturing sectors: Jordi ANDREU SUGRANYES. *El Camp de Tarragona i el Priorat durant els segles XVIII i XIX*. Doctoral thesis. UAB, Barcelona 1994; Joan GIMÉNEZ BLASCO. *Mataró en la Catalunya del segle XVII*. Caixa d'Estalvis Laietana, Mataró 2001; Alexandra CAPDEVILA MUNTADAS. *Pagesos, mariners i comerciants a la Catalunya litoral. El Maresme a l'època moderna*. Doctoral thesis. UB, Barcelona 2004.
- [12] On the Bourbon repression during and after the War of the Succession in the guise of summary executions, imprisonments and exiles, as well as the scope of the institutional, cultural, linguistic and symbolic repression, see primarily: Joaquim ALBAREDA. *Felipe V y el triunfo del absolutismo*. Generalitat de Catalunya, Barcelona 2002, pp. 181-219; Agustí ALCOBERRO. *L'exili austriacista (1713-1747)*. Fundació Noguera, Barcelona 2002, 2 v.; Josep M. TORRAS I RIBÉ. *Felip V contra Catalunya*, Rafael Dalmau, Barcelona 2005; Antoni MUÑOZ and Josep M. CATÀ. *Repressió borbònica i resistència catalana (1714-1747)*. Muñoz/Catà, Barcelona 2005; Enrique GIMÉNEZ LÓPEZ. “‘Contener con más autoridad y fuerza’. La repressió de l'austriacisme als territoris de la Corona d'Aragó”. In: *Del patriotisme al catalanisme*. Eumo, Vic 2001, pp. 221-238; Lluís ROURA. *Subjecció i revolta en el segle de la Nova Planta*. Eumo, Vic 2005.
- [13] Primarily: Charles JAGO. “Habsburg and the Cortes of Castile”. *The American Historical Review*, no. 86 (1981), pp. 307-326; I. A. A. THOMPSON. “Crow and Cortes in Castile, 1590-1665”. *Parliaments, Estates and Representation*, no. II (1982), pp. 29-45; Pablo FERNÁNDEZ ALBADALEJO. “Monarquía, Cortes y 'cuestión constitucion-

- al' en Castilla durante la Edad Moderna". *Revista de las Cortes Generales*, no. 1 (1984), pp. 11-34; José Ignacio FORTEA. *Monarquía y cortes en la Corona de Castilla: las ciudades ante la política fiscal de Felipe II*. Cortes de Castilla y León, Salamanca 1990; José Ignacio FORTEA. *Las cortes de Castilla y León bajo los Austrias. Una interpretación*. Junta de Castilla y León, Valladolid 2008.
- [14] I elaborated upon this topic in Antoni SIMON TARRÉS. *Els orígens ideològics...*, *op. cit.*, p. 45-60; and in Antoni SIMON TARRÉS. *Construccions polítiques...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 53-133 and 269-286.
- [15] This was categorically proven in Salustiano de DIOS. "El absolutismo regio en Castilla durante el siglo XVI". *Ius Fugit*, no. 5-6 (1996-1997), pp. 53-236.
- [16] As noted by Joan Pau RUBIÉS. "La idea del gobierno mixto y su significado en la crisis de la Monarquía Hispánica". *Historia Social*, no. 24 (1996), pp. 57-81: "From a comparative standpoint, the tragic aspect of the articulation of a Spanish political community was that the constitutional traditions were strong on the periphery and weak in the centre – exactly the opposite of what happened in the United Kingdom". The quotation is from page 81.
- [17] Regarding the project to bring Castile's political and legal system to all the territories on the peninsula, see José GARCÍA MARÍN. *Teoría política y gobierno de la Monarquía Hispánica*. Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, Madrid 1998, p. 252, which clearly states: "The fundamentals of what would later be called centralisation, absolutism and even sovereignty, are thus here, in the royal late mediaeval legislation, especially the legislation in Castile. This legislative tradition was what would fruitlessly start the assault on the pactist and federal constitution, inherent to a limited monarchy, of the territories in the Crown of Aragon in the 16th and 17th century. In short, the goal was to impose in them an absolutist, standard system that would unify all the peninsular lands under the imprint of the law of Castile."
- [18] Regarding these historical-mythical positions, for Aragon see primarily: Ralph G. GIESEY. *If Not, Not. The Oath of the Aragonese and Legendary Laws of Sobrarbe*. Princeton University Press, Princeton 1968; Jesús GASCÓN. "Los fundamentos del constitucionalismo aragonés. Una aproximación". *Manuscripts*, no. 17 (1999), pp. 253-276; Xavier GIL PUJOL. "Constitucionalismo aragonés y gobierno habsburgo: los cambiantes significados de Libertad". In: Richard L. KAGAN and Geoffrey PARKER. *España, Europa y el mundo Atlántico. Homenaje a John H. Elliott*. Marcial Pons and Junta de Castilla y León, Madrid 2001, pp. 217-250. For the Catalan historical-mythical positions: Jesús VILLANUEVA. "Francisco Calça y el mito de la libertad originaria de Cataluña". *Revista de Historia Jerónimo Zurita*, no. 69-70 (1994), pp. 75-87; Jesús VILLANUEVA. *Política y discurso histórico en la España del siglo XVII*. Universitat d'Alacant, Alicante 2004; Antoni SIMON TARRÉS. *Els orígens ideològics...*, *op. cit.*, p. 29 and forward.
- [19] Aquilino IGLESIA. "Cos místic". *Anuario de Estudios Medievales*, no. 25 (1995), pp. 683-697.
- [20] Cf. Geoffrey R. ELTON. *The Parliament of England 1559-1581*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1986; Corinne C. WESTON and Janelle R. GRENNBERG. *Subjects and Sovereigns: The Grand Controversy over Legal Sovereignty in Stuart England*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1981. For the vigorousness of the constitutionalist approaches in the Crown of Aragon, see Joan Pau RUBIÉS. "Reason of State and Constitutional Thought in the Crown of Aragon 1580-1640". *The Historical Journal*, no. 38-I (1995), pp. 1-28.
- [21] Cf. Jesús VILLANUEVA. *El concepto de soberanía...*, *op. cit.*, p. 161.
- [22] Cf. Jesús VILLANUEVA. *El concepto de soberanía...*, *op. cit.*, p. 156 and forward. Still we cannot underestimate the resonance of Eximenis' work in Catalan historical and political thinking in the 17th century. See Daniel GENÍS I MAS. "Francesc Eiximenis al segle XVII: la presència del Crèstià en els Discursos històrics de Rafael Cervera". *Butlletí de la Reial Acadèmia de Bones Lletres de Barcelona*, no. LI (2009), pp. 91-127.
- [23] Antoni SIMON TARRÉS. *Els orígens ideològics...*, *op. cit.*, especially pp. 181-198. Also: Antoni SIMON TARRÉS. *Pau Claris...*, *op. cit.*, p. 311 and forward; Jesús VILLANUEVA. *El concepto de soberanía...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 149-196; Jon ARRIETA. "La 'Lex regia' en la obra de Francisco Martí Viladamor: recepció y evolución del concepto". *Pedralbes*, no. 28-I (2008), pp. 103-140; Xavier GIL PUJOL. "Concepto y práctica de república en la España Moderna. Las tradiciones castellana y catalana-aragonesa". *Estudis*, no. 34 (2008), pp. 111-148.
- [24] Guender LEWY. *Constitutionalism and Statecraft during the Golden Age of Spain: A Study on the Political Philosophy of Juan de Mariana*. UMI, Michigan 1960; Joan Pau RUBIÉS. "La idea del gobierno mixto...", *op. cit.*, especially pp. 69-72; Antoni SIMON TARRÉS. *Construccions polítiques...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 98-103.
- [25] James CASEY. "Una libertad bien entendida: los valencianos y el estado de los Austrias". *Manuscripts*, no. 17 (1999), pp. 237-252.
- [26] Xavier GIL PUJOL. "El discurs reialista a la Catalunya dels Àustries fins el 1662, en el seu context europeu". *Pedralbes*, no. 18-II (1998), pp. 475-487.
- [27] José Antonio MARAVALL. "Las tendencias de reforma política en el siglo XVIII español". *Revista de Occidente*, no. 52 (1967), pp. 53-82; Virginia LEÓN. "Una concepción austracista del Estado a mediados del siglo XVIII". In: *Coloquio Internacional Carlos III y su siglo*. Vol. II. Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Madrid 1990, pp. 213-224; Ernest LLUCH. *L'alternativa catalana (1700-1714-1740)*. Ramon de Vilana Perlas i Juan Amor de Soria: teoria i acció austracistes. Eumo, Vic 2000, pp. 9-114.
- [28] On the political concept of "centre" and "periphery", see Edward SHILS. "Centre and periphery". In: Edward SHILS (ed.). *The Logic of Personal Knowledge. Essays Presented to Michael Polanyi*. Routledge, London 1961, pp. 117-

130. On the use and dissemination of this concept applied to Spain in the studies of John H. Elliott: Richard L. KAGAN and Geoffrey PARKER. "Introducción. El centro y la periferia". In: Richard L. KAGAN and Geoffrey PARKER. *España, Europa..., op. cit.* pp. 33-36. See, too, Jon ARRIETA. "Las formas de vinculación a la Monarquía y de relación entre sus reinos en la España de los Austrias. Perspectivas de análisis". In: Antonio ÁLVAREZ OSSORIO and Bernardo GARCÍA GARCÍA. *La monarquía de las naciones*. Fundación Carlos de Amberes, Madrid 2004, pp. 303-326. A useful bibliographic survey of this topic can be found in Xavier GIL PUJOL. *Tiempo de política. Perspectivas historiográficas sobre la Europa moderna*. Publicacions i Edicions de la Universitat de Barcelona, Barcelona 2006, especially chapter 3, "¿Centralismo y localismo? Sobre las relaciones políticas y culturales entre capital y territorios en las monarquías europeas del Barroco", pp. 113-150, and chapter 4, "Culturas políticas y clases dirigentes regionales en la formación del estado moderno: un punto de inflexión", pp. 151-181.
- [29] Basically: Àngel CASALS. *L'emperador i els catalans. Catalunya a l'imperi de Carles V (1516-1543)*. Ed. Granollers, Granollers 2000; Jordi BUYREU. *Institucions i conflictes a la Catalunya Moderna*. Rafael Dalmau, Barcelona 2005; Miquel PÉREZ LATRE. *Entre el rei i la terra. El poder polític a Catalunya al segle XVI*. Eumo, Vic 2003; Miquel PÉREZ LATRE. *La Generalitat de Catalunya en temps de Felip II*. Afers, Catarroja i Barcelona, 2004; Oriol JUNQUERAS. *Guerra, economia i política a la Catalunya de l'Alta Edat Moderna*. Farell, Sant Vicenç de Castellet 2005.
- [30] On this episode, see Doris MORENO. *Representación y realidad de la Inquisición en Cataluña: el conflicto de 1568*. Doctoral thesis. UAB, Barcelona 2002, 2 vols. The "excusat" was the Pope's concession to the king of the tithe from the best house in each parish.
- [31] The *divuitenes* were permanent regulatory committees on specific topics which after 1585 were made up of eighteen people, six per branch or estate (Church, nobility, bourgeoisie) which reinforced the Diputació del General (Commission of Deputies), made up of one member from each branch.
- [32] The seminal contributions by Miquel Pérez Latre on the topic have these basic references: Miquel PÉREZ LATRE. "Juntas de Braços i Diputació del General (1587-1593): 'Un presidi de cavallers conspirant contra sa Magestat?'" *Pedralbes*, no. 13-I (1993), pp. 281-198; Miquel PÉREZ LATRE. "Les torbacions de Catalunya (1585-1593). De les Corts a la suspensió del nou redreç del General". *Afers*, no. 23-24 (1996), pp. 59-98; Miquel PÉREZ LATRE. *Entre el rei i la terra..., op. cit.* See, too, Ernest BELENGUER. "La Generalitat en la cruïlla dels conflictes jurisdiccionals (1578-1611)", prologue to volume III of DG, p. IX-XLVI, Generalitat de Catalunya, Barcelona 1996.
- [33] For a general discussion of this jurisdictional battle, see Jon ARRIETA. "La disputa en torno a la jurisdicción real en Cataluña (1585-1640): de la acumulación de la tensión a la explosión bélica". *Pedralbes*, no. 15 (1995), pp. 33-93.
- [34] Regarding the Courts of Barcelona of 1599, see primarily: Ernest BELENGUER. "La legislació político-judicial de les corts de 1599 a Catalunya". *Pedralbes*, no. 7 (1987), pp. 9-28; Ernest BELENGUER. "Un balance de las relaciones entre la Corte y el País: los 'greuges' de 1599 en Cataluña". *Estudis*, no. 13 (1988), pp. 99-130; Josep CAPDEFERRO. "La participació de Girona a la Cort General de Catalunya el 1599". In: *Actes del XVII Congrés d'Història de la Corona d'Aragó*. Vol. III. Barcelona 2003, pp. 109-132; Josep CAPDEFERRO. "Attès los diputats no eran sinó procuradors... Relacions entre els Braços i la Diputació del General durant la celebració de les Corts catalanes de 1599". *Ius Fugit*, no. 10-11, pp. 849-870. Also, the attention given this topic in Jon ARRIETA. "El Consejo de Aragón y las Cortes catalanas". In: *Les Corts de Catalunya. Actes del Congrés d'Història Institucional*. Generalitat de Catalunya, Barcelona 1991, pp. 245-255; Miquel PÉREZ LATRE. *Entre el rei i la terra..., op. cit.*, pp. 246-258, and Antoni SIMON TARRÉS. *Pau Claris..., op. cit.*, pp. 40-48.
- [35] John H. ELLIOTT, *La revolta catalana 1598-1640: un estudi sobre la decadència d'Espanya*. Vicens Vives, Barcelona 1966, p. 108 and forward.
- [36] John H. ELLIOTT, *La revolta catalana..., op. cit.*, p. 113.
- [37] Some examples in Antoni SIMON TARRÉS. *Pau Claris..., op. cit.*, p. 59 and forward.
- [38] Cf. Eva SERRA. "Els Guimerà, una noblesa de la terra". *Recerques*, no. 23 (1990), pp. 9-36, especially pp. 10-13.
- [39] The comparison with Bohemia comes from John H. ELLIOTT. "Catalunya dins d'una Europa de monarquies compostes". *Pedralbes*, no. 13-I (1993), pp. 11-23, see p. 18. Regarding this constitutional debate, see Antoni SIMON TARRÉS. *Els orígens ideològics..., op. cit.*, pp. 121-129.
- [40] Regarding the sessions of 1626, see: John H. ELLIOTT, *La revolta catalana..., op. cit.*, pp. 205-233; Eulogio ZUDAIRE. *El conde duque y Cataluña*. Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Madrid 1964, pp. 44-59; Jesús VILLANUEVA. "El debat sobre la constitució de l'Observança a les Corts catalanes de 1626-1632". *Manuscrits*, no. 13 (1995), pp. 247-272; Antoni SIMON TARRÉS. *Pau Claris..., op. cit.*, pp. 61-64. Regarding the sessions of 1632: John H. ELLIOTT, *La revolta catalana..., op. cit.*, pp. 261-272; Eulogio ZUDAIRE. "El cardenal infante virrey de Cataluña", *Hispania*, no. XXI-84 (1961), pp. 580-633; Jesús VILLANUEVA. "El debat sobre la constitució...", *op. cit.*; Antoni SIMON TARRÉS. *Pau Claris..., op. cit.*, pp. 64-68.
- [41] I have further examined this topic in Antoni SIMON TARRÉS. "Cortes y ejército. Catalunya en la estrategia política del ministerio del conde duque de Olivares" (in press).
- [42] For this line of interpretation, see: Pablo FERNÁNDEZ ALBALADEJO. "Imperio e identidad: consideraciones historiográficas sobre el momento imperial español". *Semata*, no. 3 (2011), pp. 131-150; Eva BOTELLA-ORDINAS. "Exempt from time and from its fatal change: Spanish imperial ideology, 1450-1700". *Renaissance Studies*, no. 26-4 (2012), pp. 580-604.
- [43] See the studies compiled by Wolfgang REINHARD (coord.). *Las élites del poder y la construcción del estado*.

- Fondo de Cultura Económica, Madrid 1997; especially Gerald E. AYLMER. "Centro y localidad: La naturaleza de las élites del poder", pp. 83-105.
- [44] On this ruling class of Barcelona in the early Modern Age, see basically: John H. ELLIOTT. "A provincial Aristocracy: The Catalan ruling class in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries". *Homenaje a Jaume Vicens Vives*. Vol. II. Universitat de Barcelona, Barcelona 1967, pp. 125-141, translated into Catalan in *L'Avenç*, no. 40 (1981), pp. 26-35; James S. AMELANG. *La formació de una classe dirigente: Barcelona 1490-1714*. Ariel, Barcelona 1986; James S. AMELANG. "Distribució social i formes de vida". In: Jaume SOBREQUÉS (dir.). *Història de Barcelona*. Vol. IV. Enciclopèdia Catalana, Barcelona 1992, pp. 165-211; M. Adela FARGAS PEÑARROCHA. *Família i poder a Catalunya 1516-1626*. Fundació Noguera, Barcelona 1997. See, too, the information on certain families available in the following works: Pere MOLAS RIBALTA. *Catalunya i la Casa d'Àustria*. Curial, Barcelona 1996; Pere MOLAS RIBALTA. *L'alta noblesa catalana a l'edat moderna*. Eumo, Vic 2004.
- [45] James S. AMELANG. *La formació de una classe...*, op. cit., p. 94. Regarding the privilege of the 31st of August 1510, see Jaume VICENS VIVES. *Ferran II i la ciutat de Barcelona*. Vol. II. Universitat de Barcelona, Barcelona 1937, p. 394 and forward.
- [46] James S. AMELANG. "L'oligarquia urbana a la Barcelona moderna: una aproximació comparativa". *Recerques*, no. 13 (1983), pp. 7-25.
- [47] Cf. Joan Lluís PALOS and Ramon RAGUÉS. "Les institucions catalanes a l'època moderna i l'ascens dels juristes". *Pedralbes*, no. 13-I (1993), pp. 53-66; Joan Lluís PALOS. *Els juristes i la defensa de les constitucions. Joan Pere Fontanella (1575-1649)*. Eumo, Vic 1997; James S. AMELANG. "Barristers and Judges in Early Modern Barcelona: The Rise of a Legal Elite". *The American Historical Review*, no. 89 (1984), pp. 1264-1284; James S. AMELANG. *La formació de una classe...*, op. cit., p. 76 and forward; Josep CAPDEFERRO. "Promoció, edició i difusió d'obres jurídiques a Catalunya a cavall del segle XVI i XVII". *Ius Fugit*, no. 17 (2008), pp. 537-559; Josep CAPDEFERRO. *Ciència i experiència. El jurista Fontanella (1575-1649) i les seves cartes*. Fundació Noguera, Barcelona 2012.
- [48] John H. ELLIOTT, *La revolta catalana...*, op. cit., p. 60.
- [49] John H. ELLIOTT, *La revolta catalana...*, op. cit., p. 89.
- [50] John H. ELLIOTT, *La revolta catalana...*, op. cit., p. 66.
- [51] Basically: Orest A. RANUM. *Richelieu and the Councillors of Louis XIII: A Study of the Secretaries of State and Superintendents of Finance in the Ministry of Richelieu 1635-1642*. Clarendon Press, Oxford 1963; Robert R. HARDING. *Anatomy of a Power Elite: The Provincial Governors of Early-Modern France*. Yale University Press, New Haven and London 1979; Yves DURAND (ed.). *Hommage à Roland Mousnier: Clientèles et fidélités en Europe à l'époque moderne*. PUF, Paris 1981; William BEIK. *Absolutism and Society in Seventeenth-Century France: State Power and Provincial Aristocracy in Languedoc*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1985; Sharon KETTERING. *Patrons, Brokers, and Clients in Seventeenth-Century France*. Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford 1986.
- [52] Josep M. TORRAS I RIBÉ. *Poders i relacions clientelars a la Catalunya dels Àustria. Pere Franquesa 1547-1614*. Eumo, Vic 1998; Antoni SIMON TARRÉS. "Salvador Fontanet i Savila (1560?-1633). Un jurista gironí a la cort dels Àustria". *Quaderns de la Selva*, no. 12 (2000), pp. 79-89. Regarding the Marimons, see: John H. ELLIOTT, *La revolta catalana...*, op. cit., pp. 159, 161 and 166; Miquel Àngel MARTÍNEZ RODRÍGUEZ. *La mitjana noblesa catalana a la darrereria de l'etapa foral*. Fundació Noguera, Barcelona 2010, p. 136 and forward. Regarding Enric Folch de Cardona, thrice the Viceroy of Catalonia, see Pere MOLAS RIBALTA. *L'alta noblesa catalana...*, op. cit., pp. 38 and forward.
- [53] Basically: Miquel PÉREZ LATRE. *La Generalitat de Catalunya...*, op. cit.; Miquel PÉREZ LATRE. "L'arrelament de la Diputació del General. Pàtria i vertebració política a finals del Cinc-cents". In: *Del patriotisme...*, op. cit., pp. 31-50; Antoni SIMON TARRÉS. *Construccions polítiques...*, op. cit., p. 154 and forward. Also: Antoni SIMON TARRÉS. *Pau Claris...*, op. cit., pp. 25 and forward; Josep CAPDEFERRO. "El vigor de les institucions de la terra a la vigília dels Segadors". In: *Una relació difícil. Catalunya i l'Espanya Moderna*. Base, Barcelona 2007, pp. 47-83. Specifically on the intertwined interests of the Diputació and a social base based on the debt issued by the Generalitat, see: Bernat HERNÁNDEZ. *Fiscalismo y finanzas en la Cataluña moderna: la real Hacienda y el erario de la Diputación catalana en la época de Felipe II*. Doctoral thesis. UAB, Barcelona 2001, pp. 353-367; Eva SERRA. "Diputats locals i participació social en les bolles de la Diputació del General (1570-1638). Una mostra i una reflexió". *Pedralbes*, no. 13-I (1993), pp. 259-279. The graphs and maps in this article were published in *Pedralbes*, no. 14 (1994), pp. 199-206.
- [54] Cf. Antoni SIMON TARRÉS. *Pau Claris...*, op. cit., pp. 80-171; Antoni SIMON TARRÉS. "El Braç Militar de Barcelona segons un cens del juny de l'any 1641. Composició i actituds polítiques". *Estudis Històrics i Documents dels Arxius de Protocols*, no. xxvi (2008), pp. 231-253.
- [55] John H. ELLIOTT, *La revolta catalana...*, op. cit., pp. 314-340; Antoni SIMON TARRÉS. *Pau Claris...*, op. cit., pp. 175-189 and forward.
- [56] Antoni SIMON TARRÉS. *Pau Claris...*, op. cit., pp. 189-198.
- [57] On the military, political and economic dimension of the Salses campaign: John H. ELLIOTT, *La revolta catalana...*, op. cit., pp. 345-367; Antoni SIMON TARRÉS. *Pau Claris...*, op. cit., pp. 198-222; Eva SERRA. "Notes sobre l'esforç català a la campanya de Salses. Juliol 1639, gener 1640". In: *Homenatge al doctor Sebastià Garcia Martínez*. Vol. II. Generalitat de València, València 1988, pp. 7-28; Manuel GÜELL. *Camí a la revolta (1625-1640)*. Universitat de Lleida, Lleida 2008, pp. 135-176.

- [58] Regarding the start of the social uprising in May 1640, basically see: John H. ELLIOTT, *La revolta catalana...*, op. cit., p. 401; Josep SANABRE. *La acció de França en Catalunya en la pugna per la hegemonia de Europa 1640-1659*. Reial Acadèmia de Bones Lletres de Barcelona, Barcelona 1956, pp. 59 and forward; Eulogio ZUDAIRE. *El conde duque...*, op. cit., p. 251; Xavier TORRES. *La Guerra dels Segadors*. Eumo i Pagès, Lleida 2006, pp. 68 and forward; Eva SERRA. "Segadors, revolta social i revolució política". In: *Revoltes populars contra el poder de l'estat*. Generalitat de Catalunya, Barcelona 1992, pp. 45-57; Antoni SIMON TARRÉS. "Cataluña en el siglo XVII. La revuelta campesina y popular de 1640". *Estudi General*, no. 1-I (1981), pp. 137-147; Antoni SIMON TARRÉS. "Catalunya el 1640. Algunes reflexions sobre els encadenaments entre la revolta social i la revolució política". In: Carlos MARTÍNEZ SHAW (ed.). *Historia moderna. Historia en construcció*. Vol. II. Milenio, Lleida 1999, pp. 549-560.
- [59] On the importance of the religious factor in the revolution of 1640, see: Antoni SIMON TARRÉS. "Un 'alboroto católico': el factor religiós en la revolució catalana de 1640". *Pedralbes*, no. 23-II (2003), pp. 123-146; Xavier TORRES. *Naciones sin nacionalismo. Cataluña en la monarquía hispánica (siglos XVI-XVII)*. Publicacions de la Universitat de València, Valencia 2008, especially pp. 212-224; Xavier TORRES. "El paradigma ambrosià. Devoció i patriotisme a la Guerra dels Segadors". In: Òscar JANÉS CHECA (ed.). *Del Tractat dels Pirineus (1659) a l'Europa del segle XXI: un model en construcció?* Generalitat de Catalunya and Museu d'Història de Catalunya, Barcelona 2010, pp. 153-160; Andrew Joseph MITCHELL. "Una nueva perspectiva sobre la Guerra dels Segadors: en búsqueda de la 'limpieza de sangre'". *Pedralbes*, no. 23-II (2003), pp. 367-374; and the unpublished doctoral thesis by Andrew Joseph MITCHELL. *Religion, Revolt and the Formation of Regional Identity in Catalonia 1640-1643*. Ohio State University History, 2005.
- [60] I have interpreted this episode differently (especially the reaction that it incited in the Court of Madrid) compared to the interpretation by John H. Elliott. Cf. Antoni SIMON TARRÉS. *Pau Claris...*, op. cit., pp. 252-264.
- [61] Cf. Josep SANABRE. *La acció de França...*, op. cit., pp. 87 and forward; August LEMAN. *Richelieu et Olivares. Leurs négociations secrètes de 1636 à 1642*. Facultés Catholiques, Lille 1638; MARQUÉS DE MULHACÉN. "Una fase de la política secreta del conde-duque de Olivares. Sus negociaciones con Francia des de 1636 hasta 1642". *Anales de la Asociación Española del Progreso de las Ciencias*, no. 15, pp. 339-382.
- [62] This reconstruction of the process of rupture between the Court of Madrid and the Catalan institutions follows what has already been set forth in Antoni SIMON TARRÉS. *Pau Claris...*, op. cit., pp. 261 and forward.
- [63] See the introductory study by Antoni SIMON TARRÉS and Karsten NEUMANN. *Proclamación Católica*. Base, Barcelona 2003, facsimile edition. Likewise, on the informative and propagandist meaning of the work, see Karsten NEUMANN. "La justificación 'ante el mundo'. Difusión y recepción de la propaganda catalana en Europa en 1640". *Pedralbes*, no. 18-II (1998), pp. 373-382.
- [64] On the Spanish army's entrance into Catalonia, see Miquel GÜELL and Núria FLORENSA. "Pro Deo, Pro Regi et Pro Patria". *La revolució catalana i la campanya militar de 1640 a les terres de Tarragona*. Fundació Vives Casajuana, Barcelona 2005.
- [65] Albeit with interpretative differences, primarily see: Antoni SIMON TARRÉS. "'Catalans' i 'francesos' a l'edat moderna. Guerres, identitats i contraidentitats. Algunes consideracions". *Pedralbes*, no. 18-II (1998), pp. 391-401. Antoni SIMON TARRÉS. *Els orígens ideològics...*, op. cit., pp. 219-230. Also: Antoni SIMON TARRÉS. *Construccions polítiques...*, op. cit., pp. 264-268; Xavier TORRES. "Pactisme i patriotisme a la Catalunya de la Guerra dels Segadors". *Recerques*, no. 32 (1995), pp. 45-62; Xavier TORRES. *Naciones sin nacionalismo...*, op. cit., especially pp. 265-326; Òscar JANÉS CHECA. *Catalunya i França al segle XVII. Identitats, contraidentitats i ideologies a l'època moderna (1640-1700)*. Afers, Catarroja i Barcelona, 2006.
- [66] The Council of Aragon's consultation on the 14th of November 1652 which established the overarching political and military guidelines on the "return" of Catalonia to the Spanish monarchy, has been studied and published by Josep M. TORRAS I RIBÉ. "El projecte de repressió dels catalans de 1652". In: Eva SERRA (dir.). *La revolució catalana...*, op. cit., pp. 241-290. An overview of the repression that got underway upon the end of the Guerra dels Segadors can be found in Antoni SIMON TARRÉS. "Entre la clemència i el càstig. Teoria i pràctica d'una repressió". In: *Segon Congrés Recerques. Enfrontaments civils: postguerres i reconstruccions*. Vol. III. Pagès, Lleida 2005, pp. 27-44. Also: Eva SERRA. "Catalunya després del 1652: recompenses, censura i repressió". *Pedralbes*, no. 17 (1997), pp. 191-216. On the new political-constitutional context which arose in Catalonia after 1652, see primarily: Fernando SÁNCHEZ MARCOS. *Cataluña y el gobierno central tras la Guerra de los Segadores (1652-1679)*. Publicacions de la Universitat de Barcelona, Barcelona 1983, pp. 96-134; Eva SERRA. "El pas de rosca en el camí de l'austriacisme". In: *Del patriotisme...*, op. cit., pp. 71-103; Josep M. TORRAS I RIBÉ. "L'aparença de normalitat després de la derrota: la Generalitat de Catalunya fins al Decret de Nova Planta", introduction to volume VII of the *Dietaris de la Generalitat de Catalunya*, Generalitat de Catalunya, Barcelona 2002, pp. IX-XXIX; Antoni SIMON TARRÉS. *Construccions polítiques...*, op. cit., pp. 319-397. Also, more recently, Antoni SIMON TARRÉS. *Del 1640 al 1705. L'autogovern de Catalunya i la classe dirigent catalana en el joc de la política internacional europea*. Publicacions de la Universitat de València, Valencia 2011, pp. 61-97. On Spain's military presence in the years immediately after 1652, see Àngel CASALS. "'Que toda ella se tiene por un cabello'. La Guerra de Catalunya entre la caiguda de Barcelona i el Tractat dels Pirineus (1652-1659)". In: Òscar JANÉS CHECA (ed.). *Del Tractat dels Pi-*

- rineus...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 139-151. Regarding the ensuing period: Antonio ESPINO. "La configuració d'una nova frontera militar a Catalunya 1659-1667". In: Òscar JANÉS CHECA (ed.). *Del Tractat dels Pirineus...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 199-211; Antonio ESPINO. *Catalunya durante el reinado de Carlos II*. Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Bellaterra 1999. On the plans for military domination based on the construction of a citadel in the city of Barcelona: Antoni SIMON TARRÉS. "L'estatus de Barcelona després de la Pau dels Pirineus: presidi o ciutadella?" *Estudis*, no. 32 (2006), pp. 237-262; Josep CATÀ and Antoni MUÑOZ. *Absolutisme contra pactisme. La ciutadella de Barcelona (1640-1704)*. Rafael Dalmau, Barcelona 2008.
- [67] For the Consell de Cent, see: Josep M. TORRAS I RIBÉ. "El control polític de les insaculacions del Consell de Cent de Barcelona (1652-1700)". *Pedralbes*, no. 13-I (1993), pp. 457-468; Josep M. TORRAS I RIBÉ. "Una imatge crítica del 'neoforalisme': el control polític de les insaculacions de Barcelona a finals del segle XVII". *L'Avenç*, no. 184 (1994), pp. 30-35; Jaume DANTÍ. "Intervención real y pactismo. El Consejo de Ciento de Barcelona en la segunda mitad del siglo XVII". In: FRANCISCO JOSÉ ARANDA (ed.). *La declinación de la Monarquía Hispánica en el siglo XVII*. Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha, Cuenca 2004, pp. 115-127. For the Generalitat, see Eduard PUIG. *Intervenció reial i resistència institucional: el control polític de la Diputació del General i del Consell de Cent de Barcelona (1654-1705)*. Doctoral thesis. UPF, Barcelona 2011.
- [68] This thesis is developed in Antoni SIMON TARRÉS. *Del 1640 al 1705...*, *op. cit.*, especially pp. 69-81.
- [69] Regarding the Catalan ruling class in the second half of the 17th century, see primarily: James S. AMELANG. *La formació de una classe...*, *op. cit.*; Albert GARCIA ESPUCHE. *Barcelona entre...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 261-365; Joaquim ALBAREDA. *Els catalans i Felip V. De la conspiració a la revolta (1700-1705)*. Vicens Vives, Barcelona 1993, especially pp. 225-272; Eduard MARTÍ FRAGA. *La classe dirigent catalana. Els membres de la Conferència dels Tres Comuns i el Braç Militar (1697-1714)*. Fundació Noguera, Barcelona 2009; Benet OLIVA RICÓS. *La generació de Felip de la Penya. Burguesia mercantil i Guerra de Successió entre el Maresme i Barcelona*. Edicions de la Universitat de Lleida, Lleida 2001; Antoni SIMON TARRÉS. *Del 1640 al 1705...*, *op. cit.* Miquel Àngel MARTÍNEZ RODRÍGUEZ. *La mitjana noblesa...*
- [70] This shift in the interpretative paradigm on the meaning of Catalonia's stance in 1705 has been examined in Antoni SIMON TARRÉS. *Del 1640 al 1705...*, *op. cit.*, especially pp. 263-313.
- [71] On the impact of the war on the towns, see primarily: Josep M. TORRAS I RIBÉ. *La Guerra de Successió i els setges de Barcelona (1697-1714)*. Rafael Dalmau, Barcelona 1999, pp. 177-380; Josep M. TORRAS I RIBÉ. *Felip V contra...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 5-155. On the feelings of counter-identity generated by the conflict: Antoni SIMON TARRÉS. *Construccions polítiques...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 433-447; Xavier TORRES. *Naciones sin nacionalismo...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 326-343.
- [72] See Rosa ALABRÚS. *Felip V i l'opinió dels catalans*. Pagès Editors, Lleida 2001, especially pp. 235-316.
- [73] On this "national" feeling of defence of the local freedoms and institutions, see: Josep FONTANA. "La Guerra de Successió i les constitucions de Catalunya: una proposta interpretativa". In: *Del patriotisme...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 13-29; Joaquim ALBAREDA. *El 'cas dels catalans'. La conducta dels aliats arran de la Guerra de Successió (1705-1742)*. Fundació Noguera, Barcelona 2005, pp. 66-71; Joaquim ALBAREDA. *Escrips polítics del segle XVIII*. Tome V. *Escrips del moment republicà de 1713-1714*. Eumo and Institut Universitari d'Història Jaume Vicens Vives, Vic 2011, pp. 7-40.
- [74] Pere ANGUERA. "Entre dues possibilitats: espanyols o catalans?" In: *Del patriotisme...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 317-337; Pere ANGUERA. *Els precedents del catalanisme. Catalanitat i anticentralisme: 1808-1868*. Empúries, Barcelona 2000; Ernest LLUCH. *La Catalunya vençuda del segle XVIII. Clars i foscors de la Il·lustració*. Edicions 62, Barcelona 1996; Joaquim ALBAREDA. "El segle XVIII: un segle sense política?" In: Jaume REYNER and Enric PUJOL (ed.). *Pensament polític als Països Catalans, 1714-2014*. Pòrtic, Barcelona 2007, pp. 71-92.

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Antoni Simon i Tarrés (Girona, 1956) is a professor of Modern History at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona and a member of the Institut d'Estudis Catalans (History-Archaeology Section). His avenues of research and publications include historical demographics: *Aproximació al pensament demogràfic de Catalunya* (1995) and *La població catalana a l'època moderna. 10 estudis* (1996); the study and publications of the memoirs and personal diaries of the Modern Age: *Guerra i vida pagesa a la Catalunya del segle XVII* (1986) in conjunction with Antoni Pladevall; *Cavallers i ciutadans a la Catalunya del Cinc-cents* (1991); *Pagesos, capellans i industrials de la Marina de la Selva* (1993); *Cròniques del Rosselló. Segles XVI-XVII* (1998) in conjunction with Pep Vila; and *Cròniques de la Guerra dels Segadors* (2003). He is also the scientific director of the portal *memoriapersonal.eu*; the study of the relations and articulation of Catalonia with the Spanish monarchy: *Els orígens ideològics de la Revolució Catalana de 1640* (1999), winner of the IEC's Prat de la Riba Prize (2003); *Construccions polítiques identitats nacionals. Catalunya i els orígens de l'Estat modern espanyol* (2005); *Pau Claris, líder d'una classe revolucionària* (2008), winner of the Serra d'Or prize in Humanities (2009), and *Del 1640 al 1705. L'autogovern de Catalunya i la classe dirigent catalana en el joc de la política internacional europea* (2011). He has also supervised the *Diccionari d'Historiografia Catalana* (2003), a work in which more than 250 Catalan, Spanish and international experts have written almost 2,000 articles on historians, institutions, seminal works, journals, schools and trends in the historiography of the Catalan-speaking lands.